

very new and very capable leader of the NCTC that hopefully will tell me I am wrong, that they can produce this kind of capability to understand a threat group like al Qaeda.

I rise tonight, Mr. Speaker, to raise the importance of intelligence collaboration. We can never allow ourselves to return back to the days prior to 9/11, to the days where individual agencies or individual agencies that think that they have all of the answers in providing security for our country and intelligence for our agencies and our policy-makers. Mr. Speaker, we can never return to the days of 1999 and 2000, and I hope this is not the case today, but back in those days where the agency bureaucrats were fighting with each other over who would take credit for the best information. Let me read a couple of excerpts, Mr. Speaker.

Back in 1999, when I was pushing the CIA to establish this collaborative capability and our military was actually using that capability, focusing on emerging threats like al Qaeda, this conversation went back and forth, Mr. Speaker, September 1999. This is, by the way, written from military intelligence officers, a summary of notes to me.

At the military's inception, the CIA drags its feet and limits its support to the effort. In an off-the-record conversation between the DCI and the CIA representative to this military unit, a man that I will call Dave and our military intelligence officer explains that even though he understands the military's effort is against the global infrastructure of al Qaeda, he tells me that the CIA will, and I quote, never provide the best information on al Qaeda, end quote. Why would they not do that? Because of the effort that they were taking as part of a finding they had on bin Laden himself and if the military's project was successful it would, quote, steal their thunder. Steal the CIA's thunder.

Dave went on to say that short of the CINC, General so and so, calling the Director, George Tenet, directly, the CIA would never provide the best information to the military on al Qaeda. To my knowledge, that information was never provided.

Mr. Speaker, never again can America allow intelligence bureaucrats to argue back and forth over who is going to steal whose thunder, that you heaven forbid would want to embarrass the CIA because a military intelligence unit got information that is supposed to be under their authority and jurisdiction.

Mr. Speaker, I am not going to read all these pages, but this classified information that I have to back up what I have given in unclassified format, will be provided and has been provided for the chairman of our intelligence oversight committee and our armed services oversight committee.

Again, I have to ask the question, why did the 9/11 Commission not investigate this entire situation? Why did

the 9/11 Commission not ask the question about the military's recommendation against the Mohamed Atta cell? Why did the 9/11 Commission not document the internal battles and disputes between agency personnel going after the same terrorist organization al Qaeda?

If we are truly going to have an understanding of the need to reform our intelligence system, then we have to be honest with the American people about the past.

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Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight because I am very troubled by what I have seen and by what I have heard. I have interviewed and talked to some very brave military intelligence officers who, back in 1999 and 2000, were involved in protecting America. They knew what we needed, and they were trying to do it. As I have read to you, there were some in other agencies, especially the CIA and some in DIA, who were saying you cannot do that, that is not your area. That is our area. You cannot steal our thunder. That is our job, not your job.

Never again, Mr. Speaker, can we allow agency bureaucrats to argue over who is going to get the credit for solving the next attack or planned attack against us. I do not rise tonight, Mr. Speaker, to embarrass anyone. I rise tonight because of my own frustration. We knew 6 years ago what direction we had to go. The agency said we do not need that, Congressman, we know better than the Congress. Trust us.

Thank goodness President Bush put that system in place when he took office. If we had had that system in 1999 and 2000, which the military had already developed as a prototype, and if we had followed the lead of the military entity that identified the al Qaeda cell of Mohamed Atta, then perhaps, Mr. Speaker, 9/11 would never have occurred. Certainly taking out the Mohamed Atta cell and two of the terrorists that were with him, would have had a profound positive impact in shutting down the major plan against us that moved forward on September 11, 2001.

Mr. Speaker, I have placed these documents in the RECORD because I want our colleagues to have a chance to read them. I want our colleagues to see the facts and the information, and I want to support our very capable chairman, the gentleman from California (Mr. HUNTER) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. HOEKSTRA) as they move forward with an investigation.

We have to ask the question, why have these issues not been brought forth before this day? I had my Chief of Staff call the 9/11 Commission staff and ask the question: Why did you not mention Able Danger in your report? The Deputy Chief of Staff said, well, we looked at it, but we did not want to go down that direction.

So the question, Mr. Speaker, is why did they not want to go down that direction? Where will that lead us? Why

do we not want to see the answers to the questions I have raised tonight? Who made the decision to tell our military not to pursue Mohamed Atta? Who made the decision that said that we are fearful of the fallout from Waco politically?

Were those decisions made by lawyers? Were they made by policy-makers? Who within the administration in 2000 was responsible for those actions? This body and the American people need to know.

CORRECTION TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD OF FRIDAY, JUNE 24, 2005, AT PAGE H5116

Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, I have a point of personal privilege.

Mr. Chairman, I believe, under the traditions of the House, the Chair is the Speaker of the Whole House, and the Chair has an obligation to call the vote in the manner in which the vote was arrived at under the voice vote. It is not a question of whether the ayes or the noes will prevail on a recorded vote. The question is what happened on the floor at that particular time. In this instance, the yeas prevailed, and the Chair said the noes prevailed.

A number of years ago, we had very heated debates on this floor from the Republican side, from Mr. Walker, because they felt that they were insulted, especially when cameras came into this Chamber, that the Chair would call votes against their interests when they clearly prevailed on the voice. The Chair was admonished by the Speaker of the House, and we went back to what was the traditionally fair point of view.

So I would ask the Chair in the future, and future Chairs, to recognize that the Chair is calling the event that takes place in front of the Chair on the floor, not what the Chair perceives to be, and may be correctly so, the outcome of the vote later on in the day when the recorded vote is taken.

Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote on the Chair's ruling.

CORRECTION TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD OF FRIDAY, JUNE 24, 2005, AT PAGE H5163

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 337, the previous question is ordered.

Mr. DELAY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the minimum time for electronic voting on any motion to recommit may be 5 minutes, notwithstanding that it would be the first vote in a series.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, we cannot hear.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my objection, and I support the gentleman's motion.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?